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Suppose you are a police officer on the brink of finding out who committed the murder you are 
investigating. You have probable cause to suspect someone, and you have his phone wiretapped. 
Unfortunately, when you listen to the taped conversations, you only hear gibberish. Did you 
intercept a fax message? No, it turns out that the suspect regularly scrambles his wire 
communications: he uses encryption to keep his conversations and computer messages secret. 
This, then, does not lead you any further. 
Therefore, you decide to do a search at the suspect's place. There is no incriminating evidence 
readily at hand, but you have reason to believe that in the computer, incriminating messages may 
be stored, and perhaps also a diary. You browse eagerly in his computer, but when you click on 
the file diary.doc, the computer asks for your password for decryption. The file turns out to be 






So, what do you do? The only way to get that last bit of information you need to finalise the 
evidence, is to command the suspect to decrypt the scrambled files or to give you his password. 
But would this not force him to provide evidence against himself?  
It is likely that a power to demand decryption is an infringement of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Since this privilege is not absolute, the legislature could, in principle, decide to 
enact such a power. Is this justified? To what extent does the privilege against self-incrimination 
stretch? In this paper, I will deal with these questions, and suggest a way for legislatures to 
answer them. I will base my analysis on the situation in the Netherlands, and indicate the 
discussion in the United Kingdom, where these questions have been discussed on the basis of 
legislative proposals.3  
 
                                                 
1 Dr. Bert-Jaap Koops is a senior research fellow with the Center for Law, Public Administration and 
Informatisation of Tilburg University, the Netherlands. 
2 This paper is based on research I conducted with a grant from the National Programme Information 
Technology and Law (ITeR). The text of this paper was finished on 1 January 2000. A more extensive 
study in Dutch will appear in the first half of 2000 in the ITeR series.  
3 For an analysis of the situation in US law, see Reitinger 1996 and Sergienko 1996. 
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The crypto controversy 
 
Cryptography (secret writing), or crypto for short, is a means to hide data from unauthorised 
people. Since the 1970s, robust and reliable automated crypto systems provide efficient and 
generally uncrackable protection of communications and stored data. Since the mid-1990s, crypto 
programs have become user-friendlier and more widespread, and you can download several good 
programs from the Internet, such as Pretty Good Privacy.  
To encrypt data, you need a crypto program and a key. For decrypting the data, you need the 
decryption key, which is the same as the encryption key in "symmetric" cryptography (such as 
DES), or a different one in "asymmetric" or "public-key" cryptography (such as PGP). The 
decryption key (which is indeed key to keeping the data secret) must be kept secret, and is 
generally stored safely on a diskette or a hard disk, protected by a password.  
More and more people are starting to use cryptography, and it is being built in in programs and 
the information infrastructure, because it is one of the best ways to provide information security – 
a requisite for electronic commerce. Since the middle of the 1990s, cryptography has proved itself 
an essential tool in the information society.  
However, cryptography is not only used to safeguard e-commerce. Criminals are increasingly 
becoming aware of its potential to shield their incriminating information traffic from 
eavesdropping and computer-searching police. This has caused governments to think of ways to 
promote the good uses of cryptography and at the same time of preventing criminals from using it 
to thwart the police. This has turned out to be impossible. Whatever governments have come up 
with, such as requirements to store keys with third parties, has proved ineffective and 
unacceptable to the large majority of information citizens. My research into this issue has led me 
to the conclusion that the only way to really do something about the crypto problems for law 
enforcement, is to enact a power for the police to require suspects to decrypt.4 Whether that is 
acceptable, in the light of the privilege against self-incrimination, is a complex issue, which 
requires careful study of the background of the privilege and of the pros and cons of such a 
power. So far, governments have been wary with infringing the privilege against self-
incrimination for this purpose. 
 
Current legal status of the decryption command 
The Netherlands 
 
During the Dutch parliamentary discussions over the Computer Crime Act (CCA), in 1992, the 
legislature became aware of the potential problems cryptography poses to law enforcement. They 
decided to introduce a power for the police to command someone to decrypt during a search. 
They respected, however, the privilege against self-incrimination, and so this command cannot be 
given to suspects (art. 125m DCCP). Then, in January 1998, a follow-up to the CCA was 
proposed, the Computer Crime Act II. This contained the power to demand people to decrypt data 
collected during a search or in a wiretap, and this time, the act proposed to also give this 
                                                 
4 See my thesis, Koops 1998, in particular Chapter 8. 
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command to suspects, if there is grave evidence (“ernstige bezwaren”) against the suspect and if 
this is urgently necessary for finding the truth. Several protests from the legal community were 
raised, and the Minister decided to withdraw the provision in the draft law that was submitted to 
Parliament in July 1999,5 thus - again - respecting the privilege against self-incrimination.  
The United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, the government has been developing a crypto policy since 1996, with numerous 
consultation documents and proposals to regulate cryptography. Earlier versions of the policy 
were based on the idea that the crypto problem for law enforcement could be addressed by 
requiring people to deposit their keys with third parties. Given the many protests from UK 
citizens, and the intrinsic problems of such an approach, the government gradually moved to a 
position of voluntary key deposits and a requirement for people to decrypt when commanded by 
the police. This approach culminated in the consultation document Building Confidence in 
Electronic Commerce of 5 March 1999 and the subsequent E-Communications Bill. The 
consultation document proposed a power to require any person, upon service of a written notice, 
to produce plaintext or a decryption key (or password protecting a key). The ability to serve a 
written notice will be ancillary to powers for wiretapping or searching and seizing. According to 
the government, this power would not infringe the privilege against self-incrimination. To ensure 
compliance, the government would make it an offence not to comply with the terms of a written 
notice without reasonable excuse. 
Then, on 23 July 1999, the government published a draft Electronic Communications Bill, 
together with a new consultation document Promoting Electronic Commerce. Consultation on 
Draft Legislation and the Government's Response to the Trade and Industry Committee's Report, 
which also contains the Explanatory Notes to the draft Bill.  
Article 10 of the draft bill contained a power to require disclosure of a crypto key. For encrypted 
material lawfully obtained, a written notice can be given to a person who appears to be in the 
possession of the key, to provide the encrypted information in intelligible form (that is, in the 
condition in which it was before any encryption or similar process was applied to it), or, if the 
notice explicitly orders so, to disclose the key. The notice needs to be authorised by the 
appropriate authority (depending on the powers under which the encrypted material was 
obtained), such as the Secretary of State, a judge, or a senior police officer.  
Failing to comply with such a notice is an offence punishable with up to two years' imprisonment. 
It is a defence to show that you do not have the key, if you give sufficient information to enable 
possession of the key; likewise, it is a defence to show that it is not reasonably practicable to 
disclose the key, if you show that you provided it as soon as this was reasonably practicable. 
This section of the EC Bill in particular caused a storm of protests, both from the ICT and the 
legal communities in the UK. The power was generally thought to breach the right to a fair trial 
as enshrined in article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.6 The law-enforcement 
problems caused by cryptography were considered by far not serious enough to warrant the 
burden-of-proof reversal and the high punishment for not cooperating. The objections were 
                                                 
5 Kamerstukken II 1998-1999, 26 671, nrs. 1-3. 
6 See, e.g., Beatson & Eicke 1999. 
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illustrated by a letter sent by the organisation Stand to Jack Straw, Home Secretary, containing an 
‘confession to a crime’ encrypted with a key pair generated on Straw’s name. The Metropolitan 
Police was informed that Straw was in possession of this information, and the keys were then 
destroyed by Stand. This way, Straw would be liable for two years in prison, unless he could 
prove that he did not know the key - which he could not, because Stand might have sent him a 
copy.7  
After much protest, the government withdrew the contentious provision from the E-
Communications Bill, in order to re-insert it in a Regulation of Investigatory Powers bill. The 
government was, however, still of the opinion that the power to demand decryption from suspects 
does not infringe art. 6 ECHR. As of January 2000, the discussions on the issue continue in the 
UK, and it is unclear what the outcome will be. 
 
The privilege against self-incrimination  
 
To be able to judge whether and to what extent a decryption command infringes the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and whether such an infringement is acceptable given the interests at 
stake, one must study the way the privilege has been interpreted and what infringements have 
been allowed to date. I will therefore first analyse the privilege, and subsequently give an 
overview of infringements that have been allowed in Dutch law. 
 
The privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental legal principle that is part of the right to 
a fair trial. It says that a suspect cannot be forced to incriminate himself or to yield evidence 
against himself. The privilege is recognised in most countries, either explicitly in the constitution 
or implicitly through case law. It is included explicitly in several international treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 14 para. 3 sub g: everyone charged 
with a criminal offence has the right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess 
guilt) and the Statute for the International Criminal Court (article 55 para 1 sub a: a person shall 
not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt).  
Moreover, the privilege is enshrined in article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, as 
interpreted by the European Court. The right to a fair trial incorporates “the right of anyone 
‘charged with a criminal offence’, within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Art. 6,8 to 
remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating himself.”9 In three cases,10 the European 
Court has laid down the basis for determining the meaning of the privilege against self-
                                                 
7 Stand 1999. 
8 The "autonomous meaning" of the term "criminal charge" means that the European 
Court does not only look at the classification of the alleged offence in a nation's law 
(criminal or otherwise), but also at the nature of the offence and the nature of the penalty 
threatened.  
9 ECHR 25 February 1993 (Funke v. France). 
10 ECHR 25 February 1993 (Funke v. France), ECHR 17 December 1996 (Saunders v. 
United Kingdom) and ECHR 8 February 1996 (Murray v. United Kingdom). 
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incrimination, but at the same time, it has caused considerable confusion over this meaning. The 
Saunders case seems to give the most definitive statement about the privilege. The privilege  
is primarily concerned, however, with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent. (...) it does 
not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused through 
the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter 
alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for the 
purpose of DNA testing. 
 
There is not a general definition of the privilege against self-incrimination in Dutch law. The 
Constitution and the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (DCCP) do not mention it. The DCCP 
does contain several articles that reflect the privilege; for instance, a command to hand over 
goods or a command to provide access to a protected computer cannot be given to a suspect (art. 
107 and art. 125m para. 1 DCCP).  
The Dutch Supreme Court has initially said that "it would ill be in keeping with the spirit of the 
DCCP" if "the suspect would be compelled to contribute to his own conviction under threat of 
punishment",11 but since 1977, it has often repeated the magic formula: "there is no unconditional 
right or principle that a suspect can not in any way be obliged to cooperate in the obtaining of 
possibly incriminating evidence".12 The system of Dutch law indicates that, in general, suspects 
cannot be required to actively cooperate, but they do have to suffer acts that can incriminate them, 
such as the taking of blood samples. In special laws, dealing, e.g., with environment and tax 
crime, there are more compulsory powers for the police to require active cooperation from 
people, including suspects, such as handing over documents. An important reason for the 
difference between general and special criminal law is that, in the latter, cooperation requirements 
are considered necessary to find evidence at all that a crime as such has been committed. If 
people would be able to refuse to give tax documents to tax officials, tax crimes would not be 
discovered anymore, let alone prosecuted – so the argument goes. 
 
From the European and Dutch interpretations of the privilege, one can conclude that although the 
privilege against self-incrimination is usually defined quite broadly ("not contribute to 
incriminating one-self"), the scope of the privilege is rather limited. It is a strong barrier to the 
compelled rendering of testimonial evidence, implying a suspect’s act or statement which 
somehow or other involves the use of his mind, but it is only a weak barrier to other means of 
compelled cooperation, such as suffering blood samples or handing over tax documents. In my 
understanding, the privilege does stretch to these kinds of "cooperation" as well (contrary to what 
the European Court in Saunders suggested) because the suspect cooperates in incriminating 
himself, but the privilege has a weaker impact on this kind of cooperation. 
To understand why this is so, one should try to distil the rationale of the privilege from its history. 
People have suggested various reasons for the privilege.  
1. Humanity: it is not humane to force someone to contribute to his own misfortune. 
2. Autonomy: a suspect is free to choose an attitude in criminal proceedings, he can decide 
whether he wants to cooperate or not. 
3. Reliability: evidence must be reliable. 
                                                 
11 HR 16 January 1928, NJ 1928 p. 233. 
12 HR 15 February 1977, NJ 1977, 557 m.nt. GEM. 
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4. Prohibition of pressure: the privilege is a safeguard against the police using (too much) 
pressure to force a suspect to cooperate. 
The third option has great explicative value. The disclosure of things which exist "outside of the 
will of the suspect" provides reliable evidence, whereas testimonial statements generally do not 
(you do not know whether the suspect tells the truth). Thus, the privilege contributes to truth-
finding and shields the judiciary from "miscarriages of justice", as the European Court stated in 
Murray. However, I think it is impossible (and unnecessary) to pinpoint a single rationale: all of 
the above grounds have something to say for them and explain different aspects of the privilege.  
One must realise that the privilege works on different levels. First, it is a principle the legislature 
has to take into account when introducing investigation powers. They cannot enact a power that 
unduly forces a suspect to incriminate himself. Here, the reliability rationale plays an important 
part: the more reliable evidence a power yields (such as breathalyser tests for drunk driving), the 
less strongly does the privilege work. And conversely, the less reliable a power is (such as 
requiring a suspect to make a statement on his involvement with the crime), the more strongly the 
privilege works.13 
Second, the privilege has influence on the implementation of investigation powers. Here, it 
prevents the police from putting too much pressure on a suspect to cooperate when they use 
compulsory powers; this is the rationale of prohibition of pressure.  
Third, the privilege plays a part in court. The court must decide whether information obtained 
through pressure on a suspect to cooperate is admissible as evidence. This is not a simple 
deduction from the wording of the law that allows investigation powers. Even if the police have 
the power to compel cooperation, such as handing over documents in a tax investigation, it does 
not follow automatically that the resulting data can be used as evidence. This can be illustrated by 
the Saunders case. The law that compels people to make statements is acceptable in light of the 
privilege – it targets people not charged with a criminal offence. However, in Saunders’ case, the 
statements could not be used as evidence, because they had been used in the criminal proceedings 
in a way incompatible with the privilege. The privilege-infringing use of the statements was 
mainly caused by the influence the use of the documents had had on Saunders’ attitude in court, 
particularly given the negative impression it created with the jury. Thus, the autonomy of the 
suspect and the prohibition of pressure are paramount in colouring the privilege as used in court, 
besides the reliability of the evidence. 
 
Does a decryption command infringe the privilege? 
 
From the definition of the privilege, it is clear that a decryption command is an infringement. 
Whether the suspect decrypts himself or whether he hands over a key and tells the password, in 
all cases, he actively cooperates in an activity that results directly in possibly incriminating 
evidence. Moreover, in most cases, the suspect will have to show or use the contents of his mind, 
because the password protecting the key is stored there. If the password is written down 
somewhere, the police can seize the paper or copy the password themselves; the decryption 
                                                 
13 See Schalken's annotation of HR 29 October 1996, NJ 1997, 232. 
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command is targeted precisely at cases in which the password is not readily available to the 
police.  
One can argue over the question to what extent telling a password is testimonial (in Dutch, a 
"verklaring"). On the one hand, it is not a statement concerning facts or circumstances - it is more 
like a physical key in that it either works or does not work. In that respect, the password is 
independent of the will of the suspect, because he cannot alter it with his will power. On the other 
hand, since the password exists in the mind (assuming the password is not written down 
somewhere), the suspect must operate his mind to reveal it. In that respect, the password has an 
existence which does depend upon his will, because if he refuses to give it (e.g., because he has 
forgotten it), the password, to all practical purposes, does not exist anymore. This means that, 
even if the password itself is not testimonial, the act of giving it will usually be testimonial: it 
reveals knowledge of the suspect. Only if it is a foregone conclusion that the suspect knows the 
password, can one hold that revealing the password is not testimonial.  
This seems exactly the criterion that was pivotal to the Funke case, which the European Court 
decided in 1993. Funke was forced by French custom officials to hand over bank account 
documents "which they believed must exist, although they were not certain of the fact". Although 
the court decision is an obscure one, which has triggered divergent interpretations, I believe that 
this question whether the government knew or not that Funke had the power to comply was a 
crucial factor in deciding there had been an infringement of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Because the officials were not sure that Funke had the documents, their forcing 
him to hand them over was incompatible with the privilege. After all, his refusal to comply could 
not lead to any conclusion: it may have been caused by unwillingness, but also by inability.14  
 
In consequence, a decryption command is in all cases an infringement of the privilege against 
self-incrimination that prevents incriminating oneself, and it is also an infringement of the strong 
privilege that prevents providing testimonial evidence, if it is not a foregone conclusion that the 
suspect knows the password. 
 
Precedents for infringing the privilege in Dutch law 
 
Now, we are to decide whether a power to require suspects to decrypt is acceptable given the 
privilege and the other interests at stake. This primarily concerns the first level on which the 
privilege operates: that of the legislature. In balancing the interests at stake, the legislature must 
bear in mind the system of the law and the arguments one can use to infringe fundamental rights. 
Therefore, one must analyse what laws the legislature has passed until now to allow 
infringements. For brevity's sake, I restrict myself to the Dutch situation. 
 
                                                 
14 For this interpretation of Funke and the related case of Fisher v. United States, see Koops 1998, p. 175. 
The same interpretation is given by Rozemond 1998, p. 316. See also the recent certiorari granted by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Hubbell (D.C. Cir., 167 F.3d 552): the Fifth Amendment protects the 
production of business and financial records, unless the government can show its prior knowledge of the 
information. 
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First, several laws require people to make testimonial statements. There are reporting 
requirements: e.g., doctors carrying out euthanasia, farmers dealing with manure, and financial 
institutions accepting unusual amounts of money all have to file reports. These can lead the 
Public Prosecutor to start an investigation, if the report suggests that rules have not been complied 
with. Generally, the information contained in the reports can be used as evidence in a criminal 
trial, because the reporting law addresses non-suspects in regulatory, not criminal, affairs. In 
certain laws, however, an exception has been made: the law requiring the reporting of unusual 
financial transactions stipulates that the information cannot be used in a prosecution of financial 
institutions for receiving (“heling”). This is because the law is targeted at catching money-
laundering criminals, not the reporting financial institutions.  
Then, in several special laws, there are requirements to provide information, e.g., in supervisory 
activities concerning taxes, drugs, or weapons. Usually, the supervisory officials can require 
people to provide information, but if the addressee is a suspect, he can refuse to testify. This is 
not so in the Law on Weapons and Munitions: if a suspect does not comply with an order to 
provide information, he can be fined. This exception may be explained by the importance of 
controlling the risk of weapons, the restricted scope of the law, and the low punishment, leading 
to the infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination to be acceptable to the legislature. 
Then, witnesses usually are obliged to speak. In criminal cases, however, they can refuse to 
answer a question if in answering they would incriminate themselves. In parliamentary inquests, 
they cannot refuse to speak, but a special provision forbids using their answers as evidence in 
criminal cases. Thus, there are different levels of self-incrimination protection: suspects never 
have to answer, witnesses in criminal cases can only refuse to answer certain questions, and 
witnesses in parliamentary inquests always have to answer, but resulting evidence is inadmissible. 
A special case is car registration-number liability. The holder of a registration number is liable for 
certain offences committed with the car, unless he tells the police who was the driver. If he fails 
to indicate the driver, the registration-number holder can be sentenced to the same punishment as 
can be given for the offence at issue. Thus, in fact, people are forced to give information, and a 
refusal is penalised. This infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination should be 
explained by the special circumstances of the Road Traffic Act, where car owners are considered 
to have a responsibility to prevent others to use their cars to endanger road safety with impunity. 
Still, it is the only case in Dutch law where suspects can be forced to make a statement (the name 
and full address of the driver) while a refusal to comply is punishable with a prison sentence. As 
such, it hardly fits in with the way Dutch law has incorporated the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The general conclusion must be that suspects can, in principle, never be forced to make 
statements. People who are not a suspect, however, can be forced to give testimonial evidence, 
although they can usually refuse to comply if they would incriminate themselves. Generally, 
resulting evidence may not be used against them in court. It is only in very few, restricted areas 
(weapons, traffic) that compelled statements may be admissible as evidence. 
 
Second, there are requirements to force suspects to actively cooperate with the police – a broader 
class of cooperation, and less contentious than providing testimonial evidence because the right to 
silence need not be at stake. One can think of the many requirements in special laws to hand over 
documents or things that may be helpful for uncovering the truth. Also, in traffic law, people 
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suspected of drunk driving have to actively cooperate with a blood or breath test. If suspects 
refuse to cooperate, they can be punished with a prison sentence (in tax law), or with the same 
punishment as can be given for drunk driving (in traffic law). Here, therefore, we see that the 
privilege is infringed, but that the legislature has allowed this infringement after a balancing of 
the interests at stake. In these cases, the privilege against self-incrimination has less weight 
because it concerns material independent of the will of the accused. Thus, the necessities of 
enforcing special laws (regulating specific kinds of economic activities) can be considered to 
outweigh the privilege. Further arguments for this balance are the relatively low punishments (in 
the special laws) and the subsidiarity principle, which holds that a compulsory power which 
breaches fundamental rights is more acceptable if there are no other powers available to achieve 
the goals of the legislation (which is a particularly valid argument in the traffic law, because 
drunk driving can hardly be proved otherwise). 
 
This overview leads to the conclusion that, in general criminal law, suspects do not have to 
cooperate. In special laws, they often have to actively cooperate, but they usually cannot be 
forced to give testimonial evidence. Infringements of the privilege against self-incrimination are 
allowed more easily in special laws, largely because of the principle of subsidiarity (it is harder to 
prosecute crime in economic-activity regulating areas, because the crime is usually more covert) 
and because of the principle of proportionality (the more restricted the scope of the law, the less 
an infringement forced cooperation is).  
Furthermore, the laws show different ways of incorporating the privilege against self-
incrimination: sometimes, people cannot be forced to cooperate; sometimes, they can be 
addressed with a cooperation command but they can refuse to comply; sometimes, they are 
obliged to comply, but resulting data cannot be used as evidence against them at all; and 
sometimes, people are obliged to cooperate, but resulting evidence is inadmissible in court under 
certain circumstances. Only laws of the last category concern true infringements of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  
 
Options for commanding decryption 
 
Now, if we look at the issue at hand, the analysis of precedents suggests various ways of enacting 
a decryption command within - and outside of - the limits of the privilege against self-
incrimination. I present these in order of increasing infringement of the privilege against self-
incrimination.  
 
1. A decryption command that cannot be given to suspects.  
2. A decryption command to all persons. People can refuse if by complying they would 
incriminate themselves. 
3. A decryption command to all persons. Suspects have to comply. Resulting data cannot be 
used for investigation. 
4. A decryption command to all persons. Suspects have to comply. Resulting data cannot be 
used as evidence. 
5. A decryption command to all persons. Suspects have to comply. Resulting data  
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• can be used as evidence only if certain conditions apply; or 
• cannot be used as evidence only if certain conditions apply. 
6. A decryption command to all persons. Suspects have to comply. Resulting data can be used 
as evidence.  
Moreover, these options can be chosen for 
A. criminal law in general (the Code of Criminal Procedure), or 
B. only specific laws (such as tax law, environment law, or drugs law). 
To ensure effectiveness, one can choose various enforcement options. A refusal to comply with a 
decryption command: 
i. is punishable as not complying with a legal order (like art. 184 DCC, maximum three 
months' imprisonment); 
ii. is punishable in its own right, with a specific maximum punishment that 
• is the same for all crimes; or 
• is somehow tied to the crime being investigated; 
iii. can be used as evidence by drawing an adverse inference in the case against the 
addressee. 
 
In all options, variables can be added to limit the scope of the power (and the consequent 
infringement), such as restricting the power to serious crimes, a requirement of probable cause 
("redelijke verdenking") or of grave evidence ("ernstige bezwaren"), and requirements of urgency 
and necessity. 
 
As Dutch law currently stands, A1i is the case.15 The issue in the Netherlands, then, is to what 
extent a "heavier" law can and should be established, where A6 is the most far-reaching. 
 
Enforcement and ability to decrypt 
 
One of the major factors in the decision to introduce a decryption-order law targeted at suspects is 
enforcement. After all, if the order is to be effective, there must be a threat of punishment for not 
complying. Such a punishment can only be given to people who wilfully do not comply. 
Otherwise, a risk liability would be introduced for encryption use: if you ever find yourself in 
front of the police asking you to decrypt, you have to comply, whether or not you are able to. 
That is unacceptable, given the importance of cryptography in the information society and the 
fact that using encryption is in no way of itself a dangerous activity. Therefore, if someone is to 
be punished for not decrypting, the police will have to show that he was able to decrypt. 
 
Here, problems emerge. Addressees can generally easily hide unwillingness to cooperate under 
retorts of “I forgot my password”, “These random data must have been copied to my computer 
                                                 
15 In various special laws, requirements to cooperate can be interpreted as including a command to decrypt, 
like the requirement in tax law to show books, which must be presented in an understandable format; these 
could be seen as decryption commands of the type B2ii and B3ii (and B6ii in the case of the munitions law 
requirement to cooperate). 
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when I downloaded something from the Internet - I’ve no idea what they are”, and “I haven’t 
used that decryption key for over a year”.16 Especially the retort that the addressee forgot his 
password is difficult to refute. The police can give arguments why someone should be able to 
remember his password (e.g., because he is a professional crypto user who has never forgotten his 
password at the office), but there are too many arguments the suspect can give to make this 
unlikely (e.g., "I used a particularly difficult password, as my crypto consultant advised me, 
which I was not allowed to write down - and I haven't used it that often"). 
Moreover, calculating criminals have plenty of opportunities to anticipate a decryption order. For 
instance, they can remove all header information so that one cannot see whether the file is 
encrypted or just consists of random data, they can often change key pairs, and they can antedate 
files in their computers so that they can argue that they no longer remember the key with which it 
was encrypted long ago. Also, the crypto community will devise robust schemes for "perfect 
forward secrecy", in which it is not possible for the user to decrypt the data after a certain period.  
As a result, a decryption order will be particularly powerless against calculating criminals, while 
less-calculating criminals can benefit from an I-forgot-my-password retort. Therefore, it will 
hardly be useful to put a significant punishment on not complying with a decryption order - the 
prosecution will have too hard a task to show that someone wilfully did not comply. 
 
Choosing an option 
 
In the scope of this article, I cannot provide a definitive answer to the question what kind of 
decryption command the Dutch or UK legislatures should choose.  This, after all, is a question 
which requires thorough analysis of several issues, as well as a political balancing of interests. 
Rather, I shall indicate the procedure legislatures have to follow to be able to make a justified and 
reasonable choice. 
 
To introduce a decryption command that balances the interests of crime-fighting and the right to a 
fair trial, the legislature must analyse the following. 
1. What is the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination in their law system? I have 
indicated this for the Dutch situation above. 
2. What kind of crimes is at stake in which the investigation is hampered by encryption? Are 
these numerous, more general crimes, or mainly certain specific crimes? How serious are 
these crimes? This analysis should be based on empirical studies of investigation practice.17 
My current impression is that cryptography has truly obstructed investigation in only very few 
cases to date, although this may change significantly if cryptography is built in in mass-market 
software, such as operating systems and mail programs. 
3. How does cryptography hamper investigation? Does it mainly hamper the (initial stages of) 
investigation (notably in wiretaps), making it more difficult to find out who may be involved 
                                                 
16 See Koops 1999, section 4, for an overview of these technical issues. 
17 Denning & Baugh 1997 have initiated such an empirical study, but this was rather preliminary and ad 
hoc. No data avail for the Netherlands. Governments should stimulate studies of the extent to which 
investigation is hampered by cryptography, rather than roughly indicate the theoretical problems. 
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in the crime, or does it obstruct the stage of prosecution, making it difficult to finalise the 
evidence (notably in computer searches)?  
4. What alternatives are there to investigate and gather sufficient evidence? Does this depend on 
the kind of crime and investigation involved? E.g., it may be the case that in general 
investigation, there are sufficient other alternatives (such as infiltration, or using directional 
microphones and bugs), whereas in specific supervision procedures and investigations (such 
as tax and environment law), there are far less viable alternatives. Here, one must also assess 
the extent to which the alternatives infringe fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy 
and the right to a fair trial, in order to assess what is the least burdensome power. 
5. If a power to demand decryption is found necessary, what safeguards should be in place to 
make it as little infringing as possible within the limits of effectiveness? Here, one must 
choose conditions of the seriousness of the crimes for which the power can be exerted, the 
amount of suspicion against the addressee, the likelihood of the encrypted data at issue to be 
useful or necessary for the investigation, and the like. The legislature should look at 
comparable investigation powers to make the decryption command neatly fit in with the 
system of the law. Moreover, a safeguard should be built-in to prevent keys used for digital 
signatures to be handed over. 
6. What kind of enforcement is required? Here, the legislature must choose between the general 
penalisation of not complying with a legal order, a specific penalisation for not complying 
with this order - with an appropriate and just maximum punishment, and a provision that 
allows the judge to draw an adverse inference from a refusal to comply (effectively reversing 
the burden of proof for the incriminating nature of the encrypted data). Generally, the 
enforcement will not be effective given the ease with which addressees can claim not to be 





Cryptography is a potential problem for law enforcement, hampering wiretaps and computer 
searches. The only way to really solve this problem would be to force suspects to decrypt, but this 
infringes the privilege against self-incrimination. Governments can decide to introduce a power to 
command suspects to decrypt, if a full analysis of the problems in practice and the system of the 
law lead them to account more weight to the necessity of fighting crime than to the privilege 
against self-incrimination in this particular respect. It is likely, however, that such a power will 
not be effective if targeted at suspects. As a result, there should be the most serious and 
compelling arguments to introduce a decryption power to suspects nonetheless - such as the fact 
that cryptography is definitively blocking a large number of prosecutions of serious crimes, in 
which there is no alternative but to get the key to decrypt possibly incriminating evidence. At 
present, this is far from the case, and it is unlikely that such will ever be the case. 
Therefore, an infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination is not warranted. The 
current Dutch provision that a decryption order can not be given to suspects is a sound one. 
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